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NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AFTER 
CRAWFORD, DAVIS AND BOCKTING 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick* 
The 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Crawford v. Washington1 ushered in a new era of confrontation 
jurisprudence. The ruling greatly strengthened a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment protection against testimonial hearsay by requiring that 
it be subject to cross-examination either before or at trial in order to 
be admitted. What was not made clear was whether criminal 
defendants have constitutional protection against hearsay offered by 
the prosecution that is found to be nontestimonial. 
Before Crawford, the Supreme Court viewed all hearsay offered 
against a criminal defendant as being subject to the Confrontation 
Clause. Whether the hearsay was admissible depended on whether it 
satisfied the two-pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts.2 Roberts required a 
finding that the hearsay was reliable and a showing that the 
declarant was unavailable. Roberts held that reliability could be 
inferred without further inquiry if the statement fit a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception. As for unavailability, later decisions limited this 
requirement primarily to former testimony and to hearsay offered 
under exceptions that were not “firmly rooted.” 
Crawford clearly overruled Roberts with respect to testimonial 
hearsay, holding that such hearsay must be subject to cross-
examination regardless of whether a finding of reliability and 
unavailability has been made. Thus, testimonial hearsay previously 
admitted under Roberts will now be excluded if the cross-
examination requirement is not satisfied. However, Crawford did not 
overrule Roberts with respect to nontestimonial hearsay, although it 
hinted that Roberts’s days might be numbered. The Court stated: 
“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent 
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an 
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approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether.”3 
And so the law stood for two years after Crawford—testimonial 
hearsay was governed by Crawford and nontestimonial hearsay was 
governed by Roberts.4 Then came the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Davis v. Washington5 in 2006. In Davis, Justice Scalia, writing for 
the Court, reached out to address an issue that was not before the 
Court—the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to 
nontestimonial hearsay. This issue was not briefed or argued in 
either Davis or the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana,6 nor was 
it a question the Court had accepted for review. Furthermore, 
neither Davis nor Hammon had argued in the courts below that if 
the hearsay in question was found to be nontestimonial its 
admission would violate the Confrontation Clause,7 thus no claim of 
error on this point was preserved. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, in 
language so cryptic that it escaped the attention of many readers of 
the opinion, including the preparer of the headnotes,8 signaled his 
view that nontestimonial hearsay was no longer subject to the Sixth 
Amendment. After reaffirming that the primary focus of the 
                                                 
3  541 U.S. at 68. 
4  See, e.g., Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 877 (5th Cir. 2005) (“With 
respect to the statements at issue here—nontestimonial out-of-court statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy—it is clear that [Roberts] continues to control.”); United 
States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he admission of non-
testimonial hearsay is still governed by Roberts.”); United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 
703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Roberts’s standard to excited utterance); United 
States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Crawford dealt only with 
testimonial statements and did not disturb the rule that nontestimonial statements 
are constitutionally admissible if they bear independent guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial 
statements.”); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004) (“[B]ecause this 
statement was nontestimonial in nature, application of the Roberts test remains 
appropriate.”). 
5  126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
6  Hammon’s brief does not address the issue. Brief of Petitioner Hershel 
Hammon, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5705), 2005 WL 
3597706. Nor does Davis’s. Brief for Petitioner, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 
(2006) (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3598182. 
7  Neither the Washington Supreme Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court 
addressed the issue. See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850–52 (Wash. 2005); 
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 452 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]hether some nontestimonial 
statements may be subject to Sixth Amendment limitations is not before us today.”). 
8  James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 37, 38 (“The official syllabus to the Davis case prepared by 
the Reporter of Decisions and the West headnotes to the opinion make no mention of 
Roberts at all, much less any mention that Roberts was finally overruled in that case. 
And the lower courts have thus far been almost completely unable to accurately 
decipher what Davis said on that point.”). 
   
Confrontation Clause is on testimonial hearsay, he stated that “[a] 
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional 
provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its 
perimeter.”9 Earlier in the opinion he stated that “[i]t is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other 
hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay 
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”10 
Some lower courts viewed this dictum in Davis that appeared to 
signal the death of Roberts as nonbinding,11 just as other dicta in 
Crawford and Davis had been regarded as overly broad.12 However, 
eight months later in Whorton v. Bockting,13 a unanimous Supreme 
Court, again addressing an issue that had not been briefed or 
                                                 
9  126 S. Ct. at 2274. The phrasing in Crawford was that testimonial 
statements were the “primary object” of the Confrontation Clause. In Davis Justice 
Scalia wrote a broader statement that “only” a testimonial statement can “cause the 
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 
2273. 
10  Id. 
11  See the following post-Davis cases: Albrecht v. Horn, 471 F.3d 435, 468 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Unless and until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, Roberts still 
controls nontestimonial statements.”); Scott v. Jarog, No 03-73737, 2006 WL 
2811270, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2006) (“With respect to non-testimonial hearsay 
statements, Roberts and its progeny remain the controlling precedents.”). Cf. United 
States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (in the context of autopsy reports 
admitted as public records, stating that regardless of “[w]hether the admissibility of 
nontestimonial evidence also turns on an analysis of its reliability based on 
requirements rooted outside the rules of evidence, the particular guarantees of 
trustworthiness attendant to autopsy reports . . . make it unnecessary to resolve that 
question in this case”). 
On the question when lower courts should view a Supreme Court decision as 
overruled based on dictum, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“[I]f a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions, [lower courts] should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”). On the appropriate criteria for identifying dicta, see generally Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). 
12  For example, the Crawford opinion listed business records as an example of 
hearsay that is nontestimonial. 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay 
exceptions [in the Framers’ era] covered statements that by their nature were not 
testimonial—for example business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy.”). However, some records of regularly conducted activity fitting Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(6) would clearly be testimonial, such as investigative police 
reports or a store detective’s report of shoplifting offered against a defendant in a 
shoplifting prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 398–99 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2005) (refusing to adopt a per se exclusion of all business records from scrutiny 
under Crawford); People v. Mitchell, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 621 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating 
that the Crawford Court did not intend that “all documentary evidence which could 
broadly qualify in some context as a business record . . . automatically be considered 
non-testimonial”). 
13  127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
   
argued by the parties,14 stated that there is no constitutional 
protection against nontestimonial hearsay. In an opinion by Justice 
Alito, the Court said:  
But whatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced . . . 
must be considered together with Crawford’s elimination of 
Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of 
unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts, 
an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior 
cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial 
determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on the other 
hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such 
statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack 
indicia of reliability.15 
The manner in which the Supreme Court has approached the 
question whether criminal defendants have any constitutional 
protection against nontestimonial hearsay is troubling. The answer 
to this question has broad ramifications for how criminal cases are 
tried and affects a large number of cases. According to a recent 
survey, nearly one-third of the confrontation challenges before the 
appellate courts have been held to involve nontestimonial hearsay.16 
Yet there has been no briefing or argument on the question whether 
there should be at least a minimal level of Sixth Amendment 
scrutiny for some forms of nontestimonial hearsay. The Court has 
staked out its position on the question, which is apparently to 
exclude nontestimonial hearsay entirely from the protection of the 
Sixth Amendment, without hearing argument from any of the 
litigants who might actually be affected by such a ruling. 
It was premature for the Court to resolve the constitutional 
status of nontestimonial hearsay at a time when the definition of 
testimonial hearsay is still so unsettled. The term testimonial 
hearsay has not yet been clearly defined by the Court, hence the 
scope of what is nontestimonial hearsay also remains significantly 
undefined.17 Since Crawford, lower courts have held that the 
                                                 
14  The issue before the Court was the retroactivity of the Crawford decision, 
and the Court held that it was not retroactive. The hearsay statements in question 
had already been held to satisfy Roberts. 
15  Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183. The Court is in error in this statement. 
Crawford did not hold that the Confrontation Clause has no applicability to 
nontestimonial hearsay. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
16  See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 
767 (2005) (noting that among approximately 500 published federal and state court 
opinions applying Crawford between March 8 and December 31, 2004, nearly one-
third of the courts reaching the merits distinguished Crawford on the ground that the 
statements at issue were nontestimonial). 
17  The Supreme Court has expressly declined to provide a comprehensive 
definition of the term “testimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 
(2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
   
following types of hearsay statements are nontestimonial: a child’s 
statements alleging sexual abuse made to family members, such as 
parents or foster parents,18 as well as to medical personnel, such as 
nurses19 or doctors;20 an accomplice’s statement describing a 
murder-for-hire scheme to an acquaintance;21 recorded jailhouse 
conversations between a defendant’s boyfriend and his visitors;22 
private conversations with a friend;23 statements by a shooting 
victim to her family at the hospital;24 domestic business records;25 
foreign business records;26 autopsy reports;27 odometer statements 
by sellers of used cars;28 a wide range of certifications, such as 
certifications of the authenticity of public records,29 certifications of 
the nonexistence of a public record,30 certifications attesting to the 
                                                 
18  People v. Virgil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that 
statements to father and father’s friend were nontestimonial); Herrera-Vega v. State, 
888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (admitting child’s statements to mother 
and father reporting sodomy because statements were nontestimonial); People v. R.F., 
825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding as nontestimonial statements made 
to mother and grandmother); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004) (finding that statements made to mother were nontestimonial); State v. 
Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that statements made 
to mother were nontestimonial); Pantano v. State, 138 P.3d 477, 479 (Nev. 2006) 
(admitting child’s statement to father concerning sexual abuse by another); State v. 
Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 24–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (admitting child’s statement to 
foster mother because it was nontestimonial); State v. Walker, 118 P.3d 935, 942 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that statements to mother were nontestimonial). 
19  State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 514–15 (Minn. 2006); State v. Krasky, 
696 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that seven-year-old’s 
statements to nurse practitioner about her father’s alleged abuse were 
nontestimonial). 
20  United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005); People v. Cage, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854–55 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1107 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 224 (Mass. 
2006); Foley v. State, 914 So. 2d 677, 685 (Miss. 2005); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 
284, 287–91 (Neb. 2004); State v. Lee, No. 22262, 2005 WL 544837 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005). 
21  Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 695 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005). 
22  People v. Shepard, 689 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
23  Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2004); State v. Manuel, 697 
N.W.2d 811, 823–25 (Wis. 2005) (collecting cases). 
24  State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
25  United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006). 
26  United States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 958 (9th Cir. 2006). 
27  United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006); State v. Lackey, 
120 P.3d 332, 348–52 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 953 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2005); Moreno-Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 180–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
28  United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2006). 
29  United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005). 
30  United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830–34 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. N.M.K., 118 
   
authenticity of a business record,31 and certifications of testing 
devices;32 and laboratory reports identifying illegal substances or 
measuring drug or alcohol content in defendant’s blood made for use 
in criminal prosecutions,33 whether made by public or private 
laboratories.34 
It is possible that the Supreme Court may ultimately adopt a 
definition of testimonial that will cover the hearsay in some of these 
cases. But in the meantime, the constitutional questions raised by 
these cases are too important and involve too many factual 
variations to have been properly resolved without careful 
consideration based upon full briefing and argument by the parties 
affected. 
I. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 
A full briefing and argument on the constitutional status of 
nontestimonial hearsay would have allowed the Court to consider a 
number of important questions. The first is whether eliminating 
nontestimonial hearsay from the scope of the Confrontation Clause 
will remove a constitutional safeguard that has played a vital role in 
assuring fairness and balance in child sexual abuse prosecutions. If 
Roberts is overruled in its entirety, this will have a particularly 
significant impact on child sexual abuse prosecutions for three 
reasons. First, many statements made by children offered in such 
prosecutions have been found to be nontestimonial. Although a 
child’s statements to a law enforcement officer, or an agent of law 
enforcement, are generally considered to be testimonial under 
Crawford,35 many statements by children alleging sexual abuse are 
                                                                                                                  
P.3d 368, 371–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that certification that defendant 
lacks a driver’s license was nontestimonial). 
31  United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006). 
32  Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that 
certification regarding breathalyzer was not testimonial because not prepared for any 
particular case). 
33  Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating 
that a toxicologist certificate was nontestimonial); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 
N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass. 2005) (holding that toxicologist’s report on drug type was 
nontestimonial); State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 376–77 (N.D. 2006) (identifying 
evidence seized as marijuana). 
34  Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (lab test from private hospital); People v. Meekins, 828 
N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2006) (private DNA lab). 
35  See, e.g., People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that statements to police officer and child interview specialist were 
testimonial); People v. Virgil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating 
that statements to a police officer and physician member of child protection team 
were testimonial); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 800–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(requiring Sixth Amendment protection for statements made to a police investigator); 
   
usually made first in private settings to caretakers, family members, 
friends, teachers, doctors, or nurses. A large number of lower courts 
have held that such statements made in private settings are 
nontestimonial.36 
A second reason why overruling Roberts will have a particularly 
large impact on child sexual abuse prosecutions is that child 
hearsay is often offered under hearsay exceptions that are not 
“firmly rooted,” such as the residual exception or new statutory 
exceptions designed specifically for child hearsay. While Roberts 
accorded a presumption of reliability for hearsay that fits a firmly 
rooted exception, it generally required a showing of reliability for 
hearsay that does not fit a firmly rooted exception. Thus, child 
sexual abuse prosecutions are an area where the reliability 
requirement of Roberts had its greatest force.  
Reports by children that are the product of suggestive 
questioning can be unreliable, as has been demonstrated in a 
number of nationally publicized cases.37 With the help of social 
                                                                                                                  
Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170, 1178–79 (Nev. 2005) (finding that statements to police 
and child abuse investigator were testimonial). 
36  See cases cited supra notes 18–20. 
37  In 1983 and 1984, more than 350 children claimed to have suffered sexual 
abuse at McMartin’s preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. After allegations by 
one parent prompted the investigation, most of the other allegations came after 
questioning by parents who received a letter from the police advising them that their 
children might have been abused or by questioning by the Children’s Institute 
International (CII), a Los Angeles abuse therapy clinic. Some of the allegations made 
in the case were of a bizarre nature involving Satanic rituals, hot air balloon rides, 
giraffes, and tunnels. After what is purported to be the longest and most expensive 
criminal prosecution in United States history, Peggy McMartin Buckey was found not 
guilty in 1990, and her son was acquitted of a number of charges, the remaining of 
which were dropped after a hung jury on retrial. For an account of this case, see 
EDGAR W. BUTLER ET AL., ANATOMY OF THE MCMARTIN CHILD MOLESTATION CASE (2001); 
ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYSTORIES: HYSTERICAL EPIDEMICS AND MODERN MEDIA (1997); 
Dorothy Rabinowitz, From the Mouths of Babes to a Jail Cell: Child Abuse and the 
Abuse of Justice: A Case Study, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, May 1990, at 52; Buckey v. 
County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992) 
(Peggy McMartin Buckey’s post-acquittal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the county, 
county district attorney, child abuse investigation institute, and child abuse 
investigator). 
In East Wenatchee, Washington, based on evidence gathered from unrecorded 
questioning of sixty children who signed statements after extended periods of 
interrogation, 27,726 child sexual abuse charges were brought against forty-three 
adults in 1994. Most of the charges were ultimately dismissed; many of the 
convictions were overturned on appeal; and other defendants were freed after plea 
bargaining. Timothy Egan, Pastor and Wife Are Acquitted on All Charges in Sex-Abuse 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at A24; John K. Wiley, Two Wenatchee Sex Abuse 
Defendants Released, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 8, 2000, 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/wenaww.shtml; The Accused: Over Two Years, 
43 People Were Charged with 27,726 Counts of Child Sex Abuse. 17 Were Convicted 
and Remain in Prison. 4 Were Acquitted, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1998, 
   
science research, the legal system has gained an increased 
understanding of the factors, particularly the susceptibility of 
children to suggestive questioning, that bear on the reliability of 
statements by young children.38 A leading case applying the Roberts 
reliability requirement is Idaho v. Wright,39 which arose out of a 
prosecution for child sexual abuse. In Wright, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court which held that a young child’s 
statements to a doctor alleging sexual abuse of both herself and her 
sister lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify admission 
under the Confrontation Clause. The Idaho Supreme Court found 
that the statements lacked trustworthiness because the interviewing 
physician used “blatantly leading questions,” had a “preconceived 
idea of what [the child] should be disclosing,” and the interview 
lacked procedural safeguards.40 The physician had apparently drawn 
a picture during his questioning of the child that was no longer 
available for inspection, and the Idaho court found that “the 
                                                                                                                  
at A6. Dr. Phillip Esplin, a forensic psychologist for the National Institutes of Health’s 
Child Witness Project and expert witness in two of the Wenatchee trials, commented 
that “Wenatchee may be the worst example ever of mental health services being 
abused by a state . . . to control and manage children who have been frightened and 
coerced into falsely accusing their parents and neighbors of the most heinous of 
crimes.” Andrew Schneider, Wenatchee Abuses Attacked Nationally, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 28, 1998, at B1; see also Mike Barber, Wenatchee Must Pay Up, 
Court Rules $718,000 in Sanctions Over Abuse Case is Confirmed by State Appeals 
Panel, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 2004, at B1; Debbie Nathan, Justice in 
Wenatchee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at A25. 
See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that “[s]ome studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable 
to suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or 
suggestion) from reality”); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1384–85 (N.J. 1994) 
(reversing conviction of female nursery school teacher on 115 counts of sexual abuse 
of children in her care on ground that convictions were based almost entirely on 
statements by young children who had been subjected to sustained leading 
interrogation); Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A 
Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993) (examining 
interviewing practices that can produce false memory in children). 
38  See, e.g., Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children’s 
Memory, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419 (1999); Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, 
The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 33 (2000); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’ 
Suggestibility and False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359 
(1997); Anne M. Ridley et al., The Effects of State Anxiety on the Suggestibility and 
Accuracy of Child Eyewitnesses, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 547 (2002); Daniel L. 
Schacter et al., True and False Memories in Children and Adults: A Cognitive 
Neuroscience Perspective, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 411 (1995); Amye R. Warren & 
Dorothy F. Marsil, Why Children’s Suggestibility Remains a Serious Concern, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (2002);  Amye Warren et al., Inducing Resistance to 
Suggestibility in Children, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (1991). 
39  497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
40  State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Idaho 1980). 
   
circumstances surrounding this interview demonstrate dangers of 
unreliability which, because the interview was not [audio or video] 
recorded, can never be fully assessed.”41 
The Supreme Court agreed that the child’s statements lacked 
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy 
the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Writing for the Court, 
Justice O’Connor stated:  
We think the Supreme Court of Idaho properly focused on the 
presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements and on 
the suggestive manner in which Dr. Jambura conducted the 
interview. Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the younger daughter’s responses to Dr. Jambura’s questions, we 
find no special reason for supposing that the incriminating 
statements were particularly trustworthy.42 
Lower courts have generally read Wright as establishing that the 
following four factors, along with other surrounding circumstances, 
are appropriate to consider in determining the reliability of a child’s 
statement alleging sexual abuse: (1) whether the child had a motive 
to “make up a story of this nature”; (2) whether, given the child’s 
age, the statements are of a type “that one would expect a child to 
fabricate”; (3) whether the interview of the child was conducted in a 
suggestive manner; and (4) the degree to which the child’s statement 
was spontaneous, although noting that “[i]f there is evidence of prior 
interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults, spontaneity 
may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness.”43 
The Court rejected the “apparently dispositive weight” placed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court on the lack of procedural safeguards at the 
interview. While acknowledging that videotaping the child’s interview 
and avoiding leading questions “may well enhance the reliability of 
out-of-court statements of children regarding sexual abuse,” the 
Court declined “to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived 
and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional 
interviews in which children make hearsay statements against a 
defendant.”44 
Nonetheless, the message was not lost on prosecutor’s offices 
and child advocacy centers throughout the country—children’s out-
of-court statements are much more likely to be admitted under 
Wright if they are videotaped and if the persons involved in 
interviewing children who may be victims of child abuse are trained 
to avoid overly leading, repetitious, or suggestive questioning. Wright 
                                                 
41  Id. at 1230. 
42  Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. 
43  Id.; see also, e.g., Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994); Virgin 
Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1388 (3d Cir. 1992). 
44  Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. 
   
has not only had a significant impact in changing the techniques 
used in cases of suspected child sexual abuse,45 it has also provided 
a constitutional safeguard against untrustworthy statements in the 
thousands of child sexual abuse prosecutions that have been 
brought since Wright was decided. 46 
It is difficult to determine how many times trial judges have 
excluded hearsay statements as untrustworthy by applying the 
Wright/Roberts standard. Because prosecutors generally cannot 
appeal, the case reports, for the most part, only reflect cases where 
the statements were admitted and the defendant challenged that 
ruling on appeal, not those cases where the hearsay statements were 
excluded. The case reports also do not reflect how many times 
prosecutors have refrained from offering hearsay statements of 
questionable reliability out of concern for violating the 
Wright/Roberts constitutional standard. But there can be little doubt 
that Wright and Roberts have played a major role in child sexual 
abuse prosecutions throughout the United States and have been key 
precedents regularly taken into account by trial lawyers and judges 
handling such cases.47 Yet if Roberts is overruled in its entirety, 
Wright is also overruled sub silentio. 
A third reason why Roberts has played a significant role in child 
sexual abuse prosecutions is that a general consensus exists that it 
is important to have the child testify when possible, given the nature 
of the crime and the severity of the penalties. The Roberts 
requirement that the declarant testify when available has generally 
been interpreted to apply to hearsay offered under the catchall 
exception as well as under the special child hearsay exceptions.48 
                                                 
45  See Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The 
Case of Repeated Questions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 126 (2002); Dorothy F. 
Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with Social Science, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 241 (2002). 
46  See generally Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the 
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2002) (citing cases). 
47  See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Expert as Educator: Enhancing the 
Rationality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 323 
(1995); Allison C. Goodman, Two Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 855 (1995); John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on 
Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom 
Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 56–58 (1996). 
48  See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, “the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable”); United 
States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Roberts as requiring 
unavailability as a prerequisite to admission of hearsay under catchall exception); 
United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Roberts as 
requiring a five-year-old victim’s unavailability, which was shown due to her young 
   
Over the past several decades, evidence law has changed in 
many ways that makes it easier for children to testify. Age-based 
competency restrictions have largely been eliminated.49 States have 
adopted statutes that authorize the appointment of a special 
advocate to support the child during the legal process and that 
sometimes even allow the advocate to sit with the child while his or 
her testimony is given.50 In order to assist children with verbal 
inhibitions, anatomically correct dolls are used to help children 
describe genitalia or sexual activity.51 Many states, as well as the 
federal government, authorize the presentation of a child’s testimony 
by closed-circuit television or a videotaped deposition in situations 
where testifying in court would be too traumatic or damaging to the 
child.52 
The constitutionality of presenting a child’s testimony by closed-
circuit television, at least in cases where the child would be unduly 
traumatized by taking the stand, was upheld in Maryland v. Craig53 
over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia. In his dissent, he stated: 
Because of this subordination of explicit constitutional text to 
currently favored public policy, the following scene can be played 
out in an American courtroom for the first time in two centuries: A 
father whose young daughter has been given over to the exclusive 
custody of his estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has 
been taken into custody by the State’s child welfare department, is 
                                                                                                                  
age and fright, as a prerequisite to admission under catchall hearsay exception in 
prosecution for child sexual abuse); Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1014 n.6 (Alaska 
2006) (applying unavailability requirement under state residual hearsay exception in 
child sexual abuse case); State v. Allen, 755 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ariz. 1988) (same); 
State v. Robinson, 699 N.W.2d 790, 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Betzle v. State, 
847 P.2d 1010, 1019 (Wyo. 1993) (same); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West 2004) 
(providing that “statement[s] made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing 
any act of child abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another” is 
admissible where statement is reliable and child is unavailable to testify). 
49  See FED. R. EVID. 601; UNIF. R. EVID. 601; see also Nora A. Uehlein, 
Annotation, Witnesses: Child Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R.4TH 369 (1988). 
50  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2163a(4) (2004) (allowing victim of child abuse “to 
have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness 
during . . . testimony”); MINN. STAT. § 631.046 (2003) (allowing “parent, guardian, or 
other supportive person” to accompany child abuse victim at trial); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
7-11-408(b) (2005) (allowing advocate to accompany child sex-crime victim during 
videotaped deposition). 
51  See Monique K. Cirelli, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: 
Helpful or Prejudicial? People v. Beckley, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 425, 426 n.18 (1991) 
(collecting cases). 
52  In the federal context, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000) permits the use of closed-
circuit or videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse cases, codifying the holding of 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857–58 (1990). For state authorities, see Craig, 497 
U.S. at 853–54 n.3 (collecting state statutes permitting child victim testimony via 
closed-circuit in sexual abuse cases). 
53  Id. at 857–58. 
   
sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on the basis of testimony by 
a child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many months; 
and the guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so 
much as the opportunity to sit in the presence of the child, and to 
ask, personally or through counsel, “it is really not true, is it, that 
I—your father (or mother) whom you see before you—did these 
terrible things?” Perhaps that is a procedure today’s society 
desires; perhaps (though I doubt it) it is even a fair procedure; but 
it is assuredly not a procedure permitted by the Constitution.54 
However, if a child’s statement in a private setting is considered 
nontestimonial, a prosecutor could now apparently present the 
child’s accusatory statement through a third party without calling 
the child for cross-examination at all, let alone by means of closed-
circuit television. Ironically Justice Scalia’s concern about the need 
for confrontation in Craig can be completely circumvented under a 
regime that simply eliminates the requirement of in-court testimony 
by an available child when the child’s out-of-court statement is 
found to be nontestimonial. 
There is another point to consider. Almost all the statutory child 
hearsay exceptions adopted by various states have been drafted with 
the assumption that Roberts set forth the controlling constitutional 
standard. Therefore they contain reliability and unavailability 
requirements.55 If Roberts is dead, states would presumably be free 
to modify these statutes and eliminate the reliability and 
unavailability requirements from these hearsay exceptions or, for 
that matter, to repeal the hearsay rule entirely with respect to 
nontestimonial hearsay. 
II. NEED FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION 
A hearing focused on the constitutional status of nontestimonial 
hearsay would also have allowed the Court to consider the fact that 
in some cases defendants have a strong need to cross-examine 
nontestimonial hearsay. Certainly the need to test, and refute if 
possible, a hearsay statement is generally greater where the 
statement is testimonial. But this is not always the case. The 
                                                 
54  Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1995) (permitting introduction of hearsay 
statements made by child sexual abuse victims, with unavailability and reliability 
requirements); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West Supp. 2007) (providing that a 
“statement made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child 
abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another” is admissible where the 
statement is reliable and the child is unavailable to testify); OR. REV. STAT. § 
40.460(18a)(d) (2005) (allowing a special hearsay exception for children and persons 
with developmental disabilities who allege sexual abuse, containing reliability and 
unavailability requirements). The model for many state statutes is UNIF. R. EVID. 807, 
which establishes a hearsay exception admitting the inherently trustworthy 
declaration of an unavailable child victim of neglect or physical or sexual abuse. 
   
importance of testing and refutation is not necessarily a function of 
the distinction adopted in Crawford, but turns rather on the content 
of the statement and its importance and role in the case as evidence. 
A nontestimonial statement can sometimes be as vital in convicting 
a defendant as a testimonial statement. Two examples illustrate the 
point. 
The notorious trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 is an important 
part of the background of the Confrontation Clause, and was cited 
repeatedly by Justice Scalia in Crawford as well as in Davis.56 
Raleigh was convicted of treason and sentenced to death based on 
the out-of-court statements of an alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, 
accusing Raleigh of plotting to overthrow James I. At trial Raleigh 
pleaded for the court to “let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call 
my accuser before my face.” But his request was denied, and Raleigh 
was convicted and ultimately executed.57 His trial is frequently cited 
as a powerful example of the criminal defendant’s need to confront 
his accuser, and the perceived unfairness of his trial is generally 
thought to be one of the reasons for the adoption of the 
Confrontation Clause.58 
But what if instead of speaking to an examining magistrate, 
Cobham had spoken to a friend, described a plot that Raleigh had 
allegedly devised to overthrow the Crown, and stated his intention to 
“cast his lot with Raleigh.” In such a case, a prosecutor operating in 
a post-Crawford world would likely be able to offer Cobham’s 
statement through his friend’s testimony as a declaration against 
penal interest. The statement would presumably not be testimonial, 
because it was made in a private setting without any intent that it be 
used as a basis for criminal investigation or prosecution. Yet if such 
a hearsay statement accusing Raleigh of being the instigator of a 
treasonous plot had been admitted, it is hard to imagine that Raleigh 
would not still have made the same demand to “call my accuser 
before my face.” Raleigh’s need to confront and cross-examine his 
accuser would be as essential in the hypothetical trial as the actual 
trial. If Raleigh had been convicted and executed on the basis of 
such unsworn, out-of-court, uncross-examined evidence, it seems 
doubtful that his trial would have been perceived as significantly 
more fair than his actual trial. Yet under the position taken by the 
                                                 
56  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).  
57  The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS 1, 1–60 (T.B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1809). 
58  One of the judge’s at Raleigh’s trial later commented that “the justice of 
England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir 
Walter Raleigh.” 1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 520 (London, C. Knight 1832). 
   
Court in Davis and Bockting, the admission of such hearsay would 
not be considered even to raise a confrontation issue.59 
A second example where a defendant’s need to cross-examine 
nontestimonial hearsay could be as great as the need to cross-
examine testimonial hearsay can be developed from the facts of 
Indiana v. Hammon, the companion case to Davis. Police were called 
to the Hammon’s home after Amy Hammon placed a 911 call 
requesting assistance. After police arrived, her husband Hershel 
Hammon was placed in a separate room while the police interrogated 
Amy. She gave a statement to the police that said in essence: 
“Hershel punched me and shoved me down causing my head to hit 
the heater.” Hershel was arrested and prosecuted for domestic 
violence. At the time of trial, Amy could not be located, refused to 
appear, and did not testify. Instead her out-of-court statement made 
to the police was introduced as an excited utterance through 
testimony by police officers, and it served as the only direct evidence 
establishing that Hershel had committed a crime.60 The Supreme 
Court reversed Hammon’s conviction, holding that his right of 
confrontation had been violated. The Court held that Amy’s 
statement was “testimonial” because it was made for the primary 
purpose of assisting a law enforcement investigation or prosecution 
since the immediate emergency had passed by the time it was made. 
The Court concluded that his wife was a “witness against” him 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and that Hammon was 
constitutionally entitled to cross-examine her about her accusatory 
statement.61 
But what if just before the police arrived Amy Hammon had 
made an identical statement to her next-door neighbor, and that on 
a retrial of the case the prosecutor offered the statement made to the 
neighbor rather than the statement made to the police, again as an 
excited utterance? Presumably Hammon’s attorney would argue that 
                                                 
59  Under Roberts, nontestimonial declarations against penal interest are 
subject to constitutional scrutiny and have sometimes been excluded where found to 
be unreliable. See, e.g., Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1318–19 (M.D. Fla. 
2001) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus because of erroneous admission of 
husband’s out-of-court statement to his wife that defendant had asked him to join a 
conspiracy to murder defendant’s mother; such statement violated defendant’s right 
of confrontation; it failed to fit within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception and was not 
supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness); see also Miller v. State, 
98 P.3d 738, 745–46 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (applying Roberts to exclude 
nontestimonial hearsay offered as a declaration against penal interest); cf. People v. 
Ewell, 98 P.3d 738, 745–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding lower court in excluding 
nontestimonial statement on the grounds that the statement was not sufficiently 
against speaker’s own penal interest, and in any case it lacked guarantees of 
trustworthiness under Roberts). 
60  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272–73. 
61  Id. at 2278–79. 
   
he had every bit as much need to cross-examine Amy Hammon at 
the second trial as he had at the first trial (perhaps to suggest that 
she slipped to the floor rather than being shoved). The fact that the 
wife’s statement is now offered through a neighbor rather than 
through the police would make no difference in terms of its 
accusatory impact and would be entirely sufficient to convict 
Hammon at the second trial. Yet if Hammon were to appeal his 
second conviction, Hammon’s right to confront and cross-examine 
his accuser, which the Court viewed as having such crucial 
importance in the first trial, would apparently have no constitutional 
significance whatsoever in the second trial, assuming that the wife’s 
statement to the neighbor were found to be nontestimonial.62 As 
Justice Scalia explained in Davis, declarants who provide 
nontestimonial hearsay are not considered “witnesses against” a 
defendant within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.63 Therefore, 
the defense attorney would have the somewhat awkward task of 
explaining to Hammon why his wife was a “witness against” him in 
the first trial, and hence he was constitutionally entitled to cross-
examine her, but that in the second trial she was not a “witness 
against” him and he had no right to cross-examine her, even though 
her accusatory words were identical and served as the basis for his 
conviction in both trials. 
It should be noted that in both of these examples and in any 
other case where nontestimonial hearsay is offered against a 
criminal defendant, the prosecutor now will apparently have the 
tactical option, at least as far as the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned, of introducing the hearsay statement without calling the 
declarant to testify, even if the declarant is available and willing to 
take the stand.64 
                                                 
62  See id. at 2274 n.2 (noting that, because victim’s statement was made to an 
agent working in a law enforcement capacity, the Court was not called upon to 
“consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law 
enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial,’” thus, for the time being, leaving the scope of 
the confrontation right limited to police interrogation); id. at 2278 n.5 (explaining that 
“formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a 
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”). But 
see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1042–43 (1998) (“A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim of a 
crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether made to the 
authorities or not.”). 
63  126 S. Ct. at 2273 (holding that only a testimonial statement can “cause the 
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause”). 
64  Of course apart from Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court has already 
cut back on the unavailability requirement of Roberts by holding it inapplicable to 
hearsay offered under a firmly rooted exception, such as the excited utterance 
exception. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). But this is a decision that could 
   
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CRAWORD 
Finally, a hearing focused on the constitutional status of the 
nontestimonial hearsay issue would have allowed the court to 
consider whether the conceptual framework adopted in Crawford 
necessarily requires excluding nontestimonial hearsay from any level 
of constitutional scrutiny. In building the new framework that 
focuses on testimonial hearsay, the Court relied in part on an 1828 
dictionary defining witness, and on the limited historical record 
pertaining to the drafting and adoption of the Confrontation Clause. 
Arguably both sources were used somewhat selectively. 
For example, in Crawford the Court stated: “The text of the 
Confrontation Clause reflects this focus [on testimonial hearsay]. It 
applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those 
who ‘bear testimony.’ 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828).”65 However, the definition quoted by the 
Court is for when witness is used as a verb, and in the 
Confrontation Clause, witnesses is used as a noun. As a noun, 
Webster’s dictionary sets forth the following definitions of witness: 
1. Testimony; attestation of a fact or event. 2. That which 
furnishes evidence or proof. 3. A person who knows or sees any 
thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-
witness. 4. One who sees the execution of an instrument, and 
subscribes it for the purpose of confirming its authenticity by his 
testimony. 5. One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses in court 
agreed in all essential facts.66 
A limitation of witness to those who give testimony at trial is too 
narrow and has been consistently rejected by the Court, including in 
Crawford and Davis. Justice Scalia gives no explanation as to why 
                                                                                                                  
be revisited. Some states reject White and continue to impose an unavailability 
requirement as a matter of state constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. McGriff, 871 
P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994); State v. Lopez, 926 P.2d 784, 789 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); 
State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002). Even where there is no federal or state 
constitutional unavailability requirement, courts have sometimes been critical of 
prosecutors who use hearsay statements for tactical advantage in preference to the 
available testimony of the declarant. See, e.g., Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004) (showing that the court gave warning when prosecutor offered 
nontestimonial hearsay statement of domestic violence victim even though she was 
available to testify when it stated that “the State would be well-advised to avoid the 
tactic of introducing hearsay statements without calling the declarant to testify in 
cases where the declarant is in fact available”). For suggested standards for when the 
unavailability requirement should apply under Roberts, see Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 
Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. 
L. REV. 665 (1986) (arguing that whether to require unavailability should turn on the 
centrality of the statement, its reliability, the likelihood that cross-examination could 
realistically test it, and the adequacy of alternative means of challenge). 
65  541 U.S. at 51. 
66  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114 
(New York, S. Converse 1828). 
   
the Framers of the Confrontation Clause would not have intended 
the second or third definitions set forth in Webster’s—i.e., a person 
who “furnishes evidence or proof,” or a person “who knows or sees 
anything.” These are common and widely accepted definitions that 
would encompass both testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay 
when out-of-court statements by such “witnesses” are offered 
against a criminal defendant. Moreover, these broader definitions are 
more consistent with how the term witness has been construed 
under other constitutional provisions, such as the Compulsory 
Process Clause.67 
With respect to the historical record, Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Crawford is a model of originalist interpretation of a constitutional 
provision. It focuses on the likely intent of the Framers of the 
Confrontation Clause based on the experiences, practices, and laws 
of their time, as well as their apparent conception of fairness in 
court procedures. However, one danger of originalism as a theory of 
constitutional interpretation is that it may cause a Court to focus too 
much on the specific issues facing the Framers at the expense of 
their more general underlying concerns. Certainly in 1791, the 
primary focus of the Framers was on ex parte examination of 
witnesses, because that was a practice of the era that had generated 
controversy. But the most difficult confrontation issues facing courts 
today were not before the courts in 1791, so it is difficult to know 
what the common law judges who developed the right of 
confrontation or the Framers of the Sixth Amendment would have 
thought of them. There were no special hearsay exceptions for child 
hearsay or statements by domestic violence victims, statements to 
diagnosing doctors, present sense impressions, declarations against 
penal interest, and certainly no “catchall exception.”68 There were no 
911 calls, rape crisis centers, or child advocates employed to take 
statements from suspected child abuse victims. 
                                                 
67  See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witness” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. 
Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006). 
68  See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the 
Scope of the Original Confrontation Right, 15 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007) 
(“However, how could one logically infer that the Framers would not have applied the 
Confrontation Clause to “nontestimonial hearsay” if framing-era law did not yet 
recognize any exceptions under which informal, unsworn hearsay could arguably 
have constituted admissible evidence in criminal trials in any event?”); Thomas Y. 
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional 
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). But see Thomas 
D. Lyon & Raymond Lamagna, Hearsay from Unavailable Child Witnesses: From Old 
Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (asserting that child hearsay was 
sometimes received in English criminal prosecutions during that era). 
   
Surprisingly little material actually exists in the historical record 
indicating the intent of the Framers themselves with respect to the 
right of confrontation. Justice Scalia himself acknowledged as much 
when he joined an opinion twelve years before Crawford that stated 
“[t]here is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the 
Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”69 His exhaustive 
historical research in the Crawford opinion focused almost entirely 
on chronicling the evolving practices of English and American courts 
with respect to ex parte examination of witnesses and exploring how 
the right of cross-examination came to be recognized for such 
testimonial statements. It contains only two quotes pertinent to the 
actual adoption of the Confrontation Clause, neither of which shed 
any light on its possible application to nontestimonial hearsay.70 
Thus while the historical record supports the conclusion that the 
Framers had a heightened concern about testimonial hearsay, it 
does not support a conclusion that the Framers neither had nor 
would have had concerns about other forms of hearsay.71 Even if it 
could be shown that nontestimonial hearsay was beyond the 
contemplation of the Framers, the judicial construction of other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights has not been limited only to matters 
contemplated by the Framers at the time of ratification.72 
Ironically, in Davis where Justice Scalia reached out to declare 
nontestimonial hearsay a matter beyond the historical concern of the 
Framers, he made the following comment in rejecting Justice 
Thomas’s narrow interpretation of testimonial hearsay: “Restricting 
the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was 
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”73 This comment is 
                                                 
69  White, 502 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
70  541 U.S. at 49–50. 
71  Cf. id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“As far as I can tell, unsworn 
testimonial statements were treated no differently at common law than were 
nontestimonial statements.”). 
72  See, for example, cases construing the protections afforded under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, such as Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions are 
not limited to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789. . . . Not bound 
by the sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment also 
recognizes ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))), and Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is 
enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, 
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time 
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a 
principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which 
gave it birth.”). 
73  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006). 
   
similarly pertinent in assessing the constitutional status of 
nontestimonial hearsay. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Crawford, the Court held that the primary concern of the 
Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay.74 In Davis and 
Bockting, the Court reformulated this holding to say that the sole 
concern of the Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay.75 Such a 
reformulation has significant policy implications for future criminal 
prosecutions, because as the Court acknowledged in Bockting, it 
permits the admission of unreliable hearsay in criminal cases and 
makes it “unclear whether Crawford, on the whole, decreased or 
increased the number of unreliable out-of-court statements that may 
be admitted in criminal trials.”76 This reformulation suggests that 
the Court assumed a constitutional trade-off was required by the 
reasoning of Crawford—enhanced protection against testimonial 
hearsay and abandonment of any degree of Sixth Amendment 
protection against nontestimonial hearsay. It is unfortunate that 
before adopting this view the Court never entertained briefing or 
argument on whether such a conclusive trade-off is actually 
compelled by either history, policy, or traditional conventions of 
constitutional interpretation.77 
In adopting the new testimonial approach to confrontation 
jurisprudence, the Court in Crawford made the point that the new 
theory was largely consistent with the holdings, as distinguished 
from the reasoning, of its prior confrontation decisions.78 Whether 
that is true will depend on how broadly testimonial is ultimately 
defined and particularly on whether statements made in private 
settings can ever be testimonial.79 If the Court adopts a narrow 
definition of testimonial, and if Ohio v. Roberts and Idaho v. Wright 
are both indeed overruled, there will be a significant gap in 
confrontation jurisprudence demanding further consideration by 
both courts and commentators. 
                                                 
74  541 U.S. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely 
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”). 
75  See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
76  Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007). 
77  The Davis case in particular seems a sharp departure from the stated 
philosophy of Chief Justice Roberts, which has guided the Court in other areas, that 
“[i]f it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary 
not to decide more.” Shrinking Supremes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16–22, 2006, at 34 
(quoting Chief Justice John Roberts). 
78  541 U.S. at 57 (stating that Supreme Court case law “has been largely 
consistent” with the testimonial theory adopted in Crawford). 
79  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
